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CHAPTER 22 
Evidence 
WALTER H. MC LAUGHLIN, JR. 
§22.I. Escobedo and admissibility of confessions. Because pre-
vious chapters in this volume have discussed in great detail the deci-
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court which attempted to apply the 
principles of Escobedo v. Illinois l to various fact patterns, a detailed 
discussion will not be repeated here.2 Pending clarification of its scope 
by the United States Supreme Court, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court strictly construed its application by requiring that the de-
fendant must have actually requested counsel and been unsuccessful 
before there is any right to exclude from evidence any confession made 
to the police.s This construction was made over vigorous dissent of Mr. 
Justice Whittemore in Commonwealth v. Tracy,4 in which the incrimi-
nating statement was made in the hospital by the defendant after he 
had been wounded by police bullets. At least part of the reluctance of 
the Court to reverse criminal convictions might have been caused by 
the fact that the cases presented during the 1965 SURVEY year dealt with 
crimes which took place before the Escobedo decision. It can be argued 
that it is unfair to impose upon the police a standard of conduct which 
was not promulgated at the time the interrogations took place. 
§22.2. Use of treatises in malpractice cases. The legislature by 
Chapter 425 of the Acts of 1965 modified General Laws, Chapter 233, 
Section 79C, by taking away the discretion of the trial courts to exclude 
otherwise qualified statements in medical treatises, and by changing 
the notice requirements. 
By eliminating the words "in the discretion of the court" from the 
statute, the legislature has now made it possible for a party to introduce 
written expert evidence in a malpractice case if he can show: (1) that it 
is a :relevant statement of fact or opinion, and (2) that the writer is 
recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on the subject. The 
first of these two requirements is not a substantial hurdle to the intro-
duction of a writing into evidence. Proof that a writer is a recognized 
WALTER H. McLAUGHLIN, JR., is a member of the firm of McLaughlin Brothers, 
Boston, and is an instructor at Boston University Law School. 
§22.I. 1378 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964). 
2 See §§1l.4, 12.3 supra. 
S Compare Commonwealth v. Guerro, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 869, 207 N.E.2d 887, 
in which counsel was requested and conviction was reversed, with Commonwealth 
v. Ladetto, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823,207 N.E.2d 536, and Commonwealth v. Tracy, 
1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653, 207 N.E.2d 16, in which counsel was not requested and 
oonvictions were upheld. 
4. 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653, 207 N.E.2d 16. 
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authority can present a hurdle if the author is not well known, but 
sometimes the defendant can be cross-examined into admitting the 
expertise of the author. If that device is not available, a doctor may be 
willing to come to court for the limited purpose of qualifying an author 
as an expert, whereas he might be reluctant to give an opinion on the 
malpractice itself. If these alternatives are impracticable there is always 
the possibility of using the device attempted in the case of Reddington 
v. Clayman,l in which the plaintiff attempted to use the Directory of 
Medical Specialists and Who's Who as compilations published for per-
sons engaged in an occupation under General Laws, Chapter 233, Sec-
tion 79B, to prove that the author was an expert. If this latter route is 
taken there must be in addition s'ome evidence that the compilations 
are commonly relied upon by persons in the trade. This type of testi-
mony could probably be given by a librarian in a medical library. Thus 
if a lawyer can find a statement in a writing which will make out a 
. prima facie malpractice case for him and can establish through one 
device or another the expertise of the writer, the trial judge, no matter 
what his personal feelings about the value of this type of evidence, 
must under the revised statute either admit it or commit reversible 
error, whereas in the past his failure to admit such evidence was not 
to___ effectively reviewable. 
/' The full effect of this statutory amendment cannot be determined 
( until the Supreme Judicial Court indicates how strictly it will curtail 
the discretion of the trial court. Moreover, even if an attorney is not 
faced with the hurdle of adverse discretion at the trial court level, he is 
still faced with the problem of finding a statement in a medical text-
, book which will be an effective substitute for the expert testimony of a 
L-doctor in proving negligence.2 
The other amendment to the statute increases the time period of the 
( '" notice of intention to reply upon a writing from three to thirty days, 
and requires the party proposing to use a book or other writing to 
specify the exact page or pages where the statement upon which he is 
relying appears. This amendment was designed to bring the statute into 
conformity with modern concepts of pre-trial discovery. If a party to 
a malpractice action is to be faced with expert evidence from a book, 
he should know in advance of trial the exact content of this evidence 
so that he can meet it. This requirement does not place a substantial 
additional burden upon the party proposing to use the statute. If he 
has prepared his case in advance he can. easily give the thirty-day notice 
required. If the evidence is discovered at a time shortly before trial, 
the actual start of the trial could either be delayed until the thirty-day 
notice period expires, or the opposing counsel could waive the require-
ment. Only when such a writing is discovered during the course of trial 
would a pr?blem arise. This problem is not substantially greater, how-
ever, than It was when the three-day notice was required. 
§22.2. 1884 Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920 (1956), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§22.5, 22.6. 
2 See, generally, Kehoe, Massachusetts Malpractice Evidentiary Statute - Success 
or Failure? 44 B.U.L. Rev. 10 (1964). 
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§22.3. Practice on motions to suppress evidence. Ever since the 
case of Mapp v. Ohio1 has rendered evidence procured as a result of 
unreasonable search and seizure inadmissible in Massachusetts, the 
motion to suppress has been the proper and perhaps only procedural 
device for objecting to ,such evidence if its existence is known prior to 
tria1.2 A hearing upon such a motion takes place before the trial and 
is designed to give the defendant an opportunity to show why certain 
evidence should not be admissible at trial. Witnesses are usually ex-
amined at such a hearing. It is easy to imagine how a skillful defense 
counsel might tum this hearing into a pre-trial discovery hearing and 
thus learn the details of the Commonwealth's case. Such a procedure 
was followed in the lower court in the case Commonwealth v. Roy.8 
Using a vaguely framed motion to suppress that did not state what 
evidence he wanted suppressed, the defense counsel conducted an 89-
page pre-trial examination. 
The Supreme Judicial Court condemned this practice and required' 
that "[a] pre-trial motion to suppress, based upon an alleged illegal 
search and seizure, should specify the evidence sought to be suppressed, 
and the hearing should be directed to the specified evidence and to 
the grounds alleged for its suppression."4 An enterprising lawyer might 
still obtain valuable information about the Commonwealth's case from 
a hearing upon a pre-trial motion, but a fishing expedition based upon 
a vaguely drawn motion is no longer permissible. 
§22.4. Statement of deceased persons. The case of Old Colony 
Trust Co. v. Shaw,1 decided during the 1965 SURVEY year, illustrated 
the usefulness of the declaration of deceased persons exception to the 
hearsay rule.2 Quincy A. Shaw died in 1908 leaving the residue of his 
estate to his children for life and to his issue by right of representation 
in remainder. At the time of final distribution the testator required a 
deduction, from the share of each child and his issue, of certain amounts 
which he had advanced the children during his lifetime. The only evi-
dence of the amount of these advances was a m~morandum annexed to 
the inventory and signed by the deceased accountant for the testator 
and the estate. The trustees brought a petition for instructions as' to 
whether the memorandum was sufficient evidence of advances to re-
quire them to deduct die amounts shown therein before final distribu-
tion. 
The trial judge admitted the declaration, thereby making factual 
findings that it was made in good faith and of the personal knowledge 
of the declarant.s Hence, the fact that the deceased declarant was the 
testator's and the estate's bookkeeper and accountant led the court: 
§22.3.-1367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684,6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961)'. 
2 See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 346 Mass. 373, 382, 191 N.E.2d 753, 759 (1963). 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh.799, 207 N.E.2d 284, also noted in §§11.5, 12.2 supra. 
4Id. at 801, 207 N.E.2d at 285-286. 
§22.4. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1373,202 N.E.2d 785. 
2 G.L., c. 233, §65. 
8 See Slotofski v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 318, 102 N.E. 417 (1913); Carroll 
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 210 Mass. 500, 96 N.E. 1040 (1912). 
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to the conclusion that he possessed personal knowledge of the facts 
stated in the memorandum. 
Against an attack that the figures in the memorandum ~e~resented 
opinion and were therefore inadmissible, the Supreme Judicial Court 
declared a policy of construing this remedial statute liberally. It pointed 
out that the figures represented in the memorandum were summaries 
of individual facts which could be elicited if the deceased witness were 
on the stand. As in all exceptions to the hearsay rule the Court will not 
permit valuable evidence to be lost because it does not state the under-
lying facts with particularity.· 
The memorandum was also attacked because the books of account 
themselves and not the memorandum were the best evidence of the facts 
contained therein. Because a diligent search was made for them and 
their loss was not the fault of any of the proponents of the memoran-
dum the Court dismissed the best evidence objection. 
The Court, by accepting the memorandum, carried out the intent 
of the testator, something which could not have been done without the 
memorandum. The Massachusetts statute that admits statements of a 
deceased person provided a vehicle for the admission of evidence which 
was probably trustworthy and which a trier of fact had a right to con-
sider. In most states, however, such testimony would be either inadmis-
sible or admissible only as an exception for recital in ancient writings, 
a little used and ill-defined exception to the hearsay rule}1 In this area 
of the law, Massachusetts seems in the forefront of enlightened juris-
prudence. 
§22.5. Exclusion of proof of similar crimes. It is a common rule 
of evidence that, except where an earlier crime bears some special rela-
tionship to the crime for which the defendant is on trial, evidence of 
similar crimes committed by the defendant is inadmissible.1 The rea-
son for this rule is that this kind of evidence is highly prejudicial to the 
defendant and is of limited probative value. The prejudicial nature of 
the evidence is greatest in a jury trial, when minds untrained in the 
law are likely to conclude that the defendant is guilty now because he 
was guilty before. This doctrine had previously been applied without 
comment in a jury-waived trial in Massachusetts.2 It was explicitly re-
affirmed during the 1965 SURVEY year in Commonwealth v_ Welcome,8 
in which, in a jury-waived trial, the judge erroneously admitted evi-
dence of prior similar crimes. It could be argued that a judge is trained 
to disregard such legally irrelevant evidence, and that as long as there 
was sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, the error was harmless. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned, however, that this evidence is so 
d~gerou~ that a uniform rule must be applied to both jury and jury-
waived trIals. 
• Kulchinsky v. Segal. S07 Mass. 571, 5711, 110 N.E.2d 8110, 8111 (1941). 
II See McCormick, Evidence §298 (1954). 
§22.5. 1 See M~ormick, Evidence §157 (1954). 
2 Commonwealth v. Bishop, 296 Mass. 459, 6 N.E.2d 1169 (19117). 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1197,201 N.E.2d 827. 
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